Why do emerging markets …nd it di¢ cult to attract and retain capital? We exploit an unexpected liquidity boom in Pakistan following the events of 9/11, and a comprehensive loan level data set, to answer this question. Our central …nding is that backward looking credit limit constraints imposed by banks make it di¢ cult for …rms to borrow, despite readily available bank liquidity, healthy aggregate demand, and a sharply falling cost of capital during this period. The resulting aggregate failure to extend and retain capital in the economy suggests that agency costs that force banks to rely on "sticky"balance-sheet based credit limits prevent emerging economies from e¤ectively intermediating capital. A series of further checks show that the result is not driven by endogenous …rm quality concerns, and that the e¤ect is stronger for …rms with larger potential agency costs.
1
While growth theories based on diminishing returns predict that capital should ‡ow towards developing countries, economists have long been puzzled by evidence to the contrary (e.g. Lucas, 1990) . Policies aimed at pushing capital into developing countries have also largely failed to achieve their desired results. In recent years, not only have developing countries continued to export domestic savings abroad, but high growth countries such as China, Korea, and India have exported even more (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006; Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 2007) .
One possible explanation for such international capital ‡ows is that …nancial markets in developing countries lack the ability to e¤ectively absorb and hence attract or retain capital. 1 Recent work by Cabellero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2007) , proposes that such limited absorptive capacity of the local …nancial sector can explain current global macro imbalances. A common driving force behind this is …rms' inability to pledge future cash ‡ows in order to borrow as banks rely on balance sheet factors such as collateral and historical cash ‡ows when extending credit.
However, empirically identifying the importance of limited absorptive capacity remains extremely di¢ cult. Consider the ideal experiment needed to do so. One would have to pump capital into an economy, and test whether investment and balance of payment patterns are driven by an inability of the …nancial sector to intermediate capital e¤ectively. We often lack such an experimental in ‡ux of capital, and can seldom observe how capital is transmitted through the …nancial system. This paper exploits the unique consequences of 9/11 in Pakistan to see how an emerging economy responds to a large and unanticipated liquidity boom. We then use a comprehensive loan-level dataset that links the entire banking sector to borrowing …rms in Pakistan, and test whether the inability to e¤ectively intermediate the liquidity in ‡ow can be explained by the limited absorptive capacity of the banking sector due to the "backward looking" lending practices alluded to earlier.
A surprising consequence of the events following 9/11 was a large in ‡ow of capital into Pakistan. Pakistan's ensuing cooperation with the US ended the international …nancial isolation that had been in place since its nuclear tests in 1998. There was also a large reversal in private capital ‡ight as Pakistanis became increasingly uneasy with keeping their savings in the West.
Consequently Pakistan became awash with liquidity and cost of capital plummeted from 7% to less than 1% within a couple of years. At the same time, there was no loss in aggregate demand, and if anything this rose as consumption and investment went up due to increased domestic wealth and reconstruction e¤orts in Afghanistan.
However, despite the availability of cheap credit and potentially higher investment needs, banks were remarkably sluggish in extending credit. Consequently Pakistan started to run a signi…cant current account surplus. We use our loan-level data to provide micro-evidence that the …nancial sector failed to absorb capital in ‡ows due to sticky balance sheet based borrowing limits imposed on …rms by banks. These limits are based primarily on a …rm's pledgeable assets and historical cash ‡ows, and therefore are slow to respond to sharp changes in expectations.
A novel feature of our data is that it records the "credit limit"set by a bank for each borrowing …rm separately. Since unused lines of credit are costless in Pakistan, …rms generally try to get the maximum possible credit line from a bank. If credit limits are truly backward looking, and hence rigid in the short run even in the face of large changes induced by unanticipated events like 9/11, then there are a number of testable predictions. First, ceteris paribus, …rms with greater initial "…nancial slack"(i.e. unused credit limits) should experience larger growth in bank credit. We refer to this as the …nancial slack e¤ ect. Second, the …nancial slack e¤ect should be stronger for …rms in industries that experienced a larger (unexpected) increase in investment demand due to 9/11. Third, the e¤ect should be stronger for …rms that face greater rigidity in their credit limits such as smaller …rms. Finally, the …nancial slack e¤ect should not hold for …rms that ex-ante, for various reasons, are not restricted by their balance sheet conditions. Exporting …rms satisfy this condition since export sales are readily pledgeable, making such …rms relatively immune to binding credit limit concerns. We …nd strong support for all of the above predictions in a sample of 22,485 actively borrowing …rms at the time of 9/11.
The …nancial slack e¤ect that we …nd is large, with a 1 percentage point larger pre-9/11 …nancial slack leading to a 0.21 percentage point higher growth in the …rm's borrowing post-9/11. However, could this result be driven by spurious correlations? While the …rst-di¤erence speci…cation accounts for level di¤erences across …rms, a remaining empirical concern is that pre-9/11 …nancial slack may be correlated with changes in credit demand after 9/11. One 3 reason for such spurious correlation may be mean reversion. Firms with above average credit demand today, and hence lower …nancial slack, may mean revert to average credit demand tomorrow. This will spuriously create a positive correlation between …nancial slack today and subsequent credit growth. However, using lagged growth in bank credit, we show that mean reversion does not drive the …nancial slack e¤ect.
Financial slack may also be spuriously correlated with subsequent credit growth due to unobserved …rm quality. For example, banks may provide higher credit limits and hence more slack to better quality …rms because these …rms are expected to grow faster. Moreover, such …rms may also have a higher option value of unused lines of credit if they are in a better position to take advantage of an improving economic environment. As we discuss later in the paper our results that both larger …rms and exporters show a smaller/no …nancial slack e¤ect, already suggest this concern is less likely. Nevertheless, we also use parametric and non-parametric measures of …rm quality to address concerns that pre-9/11 …nancial slack may be proxying for better quality …rms.
Our parametric measure of …rm quality is based on the pre-9/11 default history of a …rm.
Firms with low pre 9/11 period default rates experience larger credit growth as a result of 9/11, justifying the use of pre-9/11 default history as a measure of …rm quality. However, including the pre-9/11 default history as a …rm quality control does not reduce the …nancial slack e¤ect.
The non-parametric …rm quality controls are based on …rm-director …xed e¤ects. Two …rms share a …xed e¤ect if they have a director in common. Since top management is a key determinant of …rm quality, the common-director …xed e¤ect non-parametrically controls for a wide range of potential …rm quality attributes (e.g. political a¢ liation, conglomerate membership, etc.). The …nancial slack e¤ect remains the same even with the inclusion of common-director …xed e¤ects.
Finally, if credit limit constraints are binding at the …rm level, we can also test for a loan (bank-…rm pair) level credit allocation prediction i.e. that a …rm borrowing from multiple banks will borrow relatively more from the bank it has greater …nancial slack with. An advantage of this speci…cation is that one can fully absorb time-varying …rm attributes, such as …rm credit demand shocks, by including …rm …xed e¤ects. Doing so shows that …nancial slack in ‡uences credit allocation even when comparing changes within the same …rm.
The limited absorptive capacity of the banking sector due to balance sheet based credit limits and thus signi…cantly retards the ability of banks to respond to the 9/11 boom. How costly is this? The costs may not be very large if …rms can substitute out of the formal market by borrowing from alternative sources of funds. However, we …nd that this is unlikely to be the case. Using the likelihood of …nancial distress as a proxy for …rm performance, we show that while all …rms bene…t from the aggregate boom through a lower probability of distress, the drop is larger for …rms with …nancial slack. We also present some tentative estimates that suggest that the loss of GDP due to this limited absorptive capacity may have been substantial.
There is a large literature aimed at estimating …nancial constraints at the …rm level. 2 While this literature has mostly focused on investment-cash ‡ow sensitivity in order to understand …-nancial constraints, our approach permits directly examining a speci…c manifestation of frictions between …rms and banks -credit limit constraints -that prevents banks from lending beyond "balance sheet factors". Since we have the universe of bank lending, we are also able to link this micro-level friction to its macro consequences and examine the absorptive capacity of an entire …nancial system in response to an unanticipated capital in ‡ux. Finally, since the data is by de…nition representative of lenders and borrowers, we are able to shed further light on the nature of these frictions by examining whether they vary across …rms and lenders.
While this paper considers the impact of a positive liquidity shock, it also relates to the bank-lending channel literature that typically focuses on negative liquidity shocks to banks and traces whether these shocks a¤ect lending (see Peek and Rosengren, 1997; Kashyap and Stein, 2000) . In particular, a related paper (Khwaja and Mian 2008, KM henceforth) …nds evidence of a large bank-lending channel using similar data from an earlier time period in Pakistan, when the economy experienced a negative liquidity shock due to the 1998 nuclear tests. A comparison of results in the two papers reveals an interesting asymmetry in how the economy responds to negative versus positive liquidity shocks. KM …nd that when faced with negative liquidity shocks, banks cut back lending to …rms. This is due to frictions banks face on their borrowing side (i.e. the usual "bank lending channel") such that they are unable to borrow liquidity externally to compensate for their deposit base shock. However, this paper shows that the converse is not always true, i.e. banks do not necessarily increase lending when faced with a positive liquidity shock. This is due to …rm-level frictions banks face on their lending side.
Thus, while banks may have su¢ cient liquidity available, they are constrained by how much they can increase lending due to standard frictions or agency costs at the …rm-level. It is not surprising, therefore, why these two types of frictions -on the borrowing and the lending sidemay lead to an asymmetric response to liquidity shocks. We will discuss this in more detail in the conclusion.
I The Context -Background and Aggregate Impact

A. Background
Pakistan's economy was su¤ering from weak growth, low investment, and balance of payment problems in the period preceding 9/11. Growth had declined to 3-4% from an average rate of 6% in the …rst half of the 1990s, central bank reserves could only cover seven weeks of imports, and the black market exchange rate premium had risen to almost 6%: While a single factor is seldom the sole cause of macroeconomic weakness, the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan in 1998 in response to similar tests by India, and the ensuing international …nancial sanctions played a large role in stagnating the economy. Denial of access to international liquidity by agencies such as the IMF put severe pressure on the Central Bank to keep interest rates high in order to stem balance of payment crises. The real lending rate rose to 9% compared to an average of 5% in the …rst half of the 1990s. The high cost of liquidity kept the local economy distressed as …rms found it di¢ cult to borrow at higher interest rates.
B. The Events of 9/11
The events that followed 9/11 led to a sudden reversal of Pakistan's economic fortunes and the subsequent period witnessed an unprecedented economic upsurge. The net result of 9/11 on the economy was an unexpected surge in the supply of liquidity, a sharp drop in real interest rates, and a relative rise in aggregate demand. We describe these changes in more detail below.
Liquidity Surge and Interest Rate Drop
There was a large in ‡ow of liquidity into the banking sector in the months following the events of 9/11. There were three main reasons for the in ‡ow. First, Pakistan's willingness to help in the campaign against Afghanistan renewed the government's access to the IMF, World Bank, and other foreign liquidity providers that had been severely curtailed due to 6 the post-1998 nuclear test sanctions. Second, a crackdown on the hundi or informal foreign exchange market stemmed the ‡ow of capital ‡ight through the black market and forced foreign remittances (Pakistan's largest "export") to be channeled through the banking system. Also the breakdown of the informal market and tightened capital controls made it more di¢ cult to send capital abroad through the black market. Third, a perceived fear of what the US and other western economies might do to private capital held by Pakistanis abroad led a large number of investors to relocate their foreign savings back into Pakistan. Thus 9/11 acted as an exogenous shock that increased the "home bias" of Pakistani savers towards domestic assets. The surge in liquidity supply was accompanied by a dramatic drop in interest rates. This interest rate drop re ‡ects two forces at work. First, the Central Bank no longer felt a need to defend its currency against speculation. Second, for reasons we shall explore in great detail, the economy (e.g. the banking sector) found it di¢ cult to quickly absorb the new liquidity ‡owing into Pakistan. The net result is shown in Figure I to less than 1% in nominal terms by December 2003. Our conceptual framework exploits this rapid drop in interest rates to generate tests for the credit limit hypothesis.
Positive Aggregate Demand Shock
The immediate period after 9/11 was likely to have been detrimental to …rms due to heightened uncertainty in the region and the threat of war in neighboring Afghanistan. However, the situation rapidly changed within the …rst few weeks, and the overall e¤ect of 9/11 on aggregate demand in Pakistan was generally positive, at least relative to what the situation had been pre-9/11. This was in no small part due to Pakistan's immediate cooperation with the US after 9/11 that saw the lifting of …nancial sanctions and provided new economic opportunities.
Figure II(a) shows the aggregate demand change in terms of GDP, investment, and export growth, all of which increased substantially post-9/11, and …rm default propensity, which declined. Since these variables are only available yearly, we average them over a couple of years pre and post 9/11. The …gure also shows the current account balance and gross foreign transfers change which we discuss in the next section.
As further evidence of a positive demand shock, Figure II (b) plots the Karachi Stock Exchange price index for publicly listed …rms, and shows a sharp and persistent rise in stock prices following 9/11. Thus, apart from the in ‡ux of liquidity, it seems that the events of 9/11 were on net also a positive shift in aggregate demand. At the very least, the view that these events may have led to depressing aggregate demand (which in turn may explain the lack of a lending response) is clearly not consistent with the data.
C. Macro Impact
Given the falling cost of funds and positive demand shock one would expect an increase in overall bank lending to …rms, absent any lending constraints. However, the macro evidence is extremely stark and shows little change in corporate lending despite such a large and positive net demand shock. It plots the quarter by quarter …rm speci…c growth rate of loans over time. The growth rate between quarters t and t + 1 is computed separately for each …rm borrowing at time t, and the average of these growth rates over all …rms is then plotted over time for small (below median borrowing size) and large …rms. A …rm's borrowing from all banks is aggregated up before computing the …rm-speci…c growth rates.
The …gure shows that despite the large drop in the cost of capital and the positive demand shock in the economy, there is relatively little change in overall lending to …rms. This is particularly stark since, as is typical and even more so in emerging economies, bank loans are the main avenue for external …nancing for the average …rm. Pakistan is no exception to this, with less than 3% …rms in our sample …rms listed on the stock market, and bank loans constituting two-thirds of the total capital structure even for listed …rms.
Figure III(a) shows that while the lending growth rates are generally positive after 9/11, they are no larger than the pre-9/11 growth rates. Given that the cost of capital dropped signi…cantly post-9/11, one would have expected to see an increase in loan growth. Similarly, …gures III(b) and III(c) show that 9/11 did not lead to appreciably higher entry rates for new borrowers, or lower exit rates for already borrowing …rms. The reluctance of banks to lend out new credit despite an abundance of liquidity can also be seen from …gure III(d) that shows a sharp reduction in loan-to-deposit ratio of banks after 9/11 as banks put more of their increased assets in government securities.
The net e¤ect of the inability of banks to absorb capital in the face of the liquidity surplus is shown in the last two bar graphs in …gure II(a): The economy became a net exporter of capital after 9/11 and started running current account surpluses. Thus the private in- ‡ight of capital is partly reversed by an o¢ cial capital out ‡ow as domestic interest rates plummeted.
The muted response of bank lending to large drops in interest rate, when aggregate demand is going up, is already suggestive of borrowing constraints. This evidence cannot be rationalized in an unconstrained world without resorting to either an extremely low and implausible interest elasticity of capital, or an equally improbable steep marginal product curve. In order to provide direct evidence on borrowing constraints, we next focus on the micro-level predictions of credit limit constraints that can then be tested in the loan level data and take advantage of the natural experiment induced by the events of 9/11. The following section outlines our methodology. This setup, which is a common way of introducing …nancial frictions (see for example Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty, 1999), gives the convenient result that banks require internal wealth (i.e. collateral) ! i for every dollar of capital invested. 3 Firms thus di¤er in the degree of collateral constraints they face.
II Conceptual Framework and Methodology
The purpose of collateral requirements is to discourage …rms from hiding their revenue ex post. Consequently there is no strategic default in equilibrium and all …rms face the same interest rate R. The equilibrium level of …rm-level investment is determined by solving the …rst order condition subject to the collateral constraint. We parametrize …rm production, Y i , as a diminishing returns technology with,
where i re ‡ects …rm-speci…c productivity and represents the elasticity of capital with respect to the cost of capital. The unconstrained demand for capital, e K i ; is given by the FOC:
However, only …rms with su¢ cient internal wealth can invest e K i . Other …rms will be bound by their total wealth W i , implying that they can only invest capital up to
: Thus wealthier …rms, and more "reputable"…rms (i.e. …rms with higher c i ) are able to borrow more.
The above discussion implies that the equilibrium amount of capital invested by …rm i is given by
Since external debt is proportional to capital, we can equivalently write down the solution as
advantage of writing the solution in terms of external debt is that D i has a natural economic interpretation. It represents a …rm's "debt capacity"or "credit limit"as determined by a bank after reviewing the …rm's reliability (c i ) and available collateral (W i ).
We have deliberately kept our setup ‡exible, without relying too much on speci…c functional form assumptions. For example, the production process (1) allows for heterogeneity in …rm level productivity. 4 There is also ‡exibility in how …nancially constrained …rms are, as determined 3 Solving, we get !i = R c i R
; and thus the collateral requirement is decreasing in ci; with 0 < !i 1: 4 As will become clear later on, introducing …xed costs or other similar forms of convexities in the production function will also not change any of our results. Since our analysis will focus on response of …rms to economic by their total internal wealth W i and collateral constraints ! i .
B. Comparative Statics
This set up can be used to analyze how an economy reacts to …nancial shocks. We consider two such shocks based on the consequences of 9/11 for Pakistan: an economy wide drop in the cost of capital, t , and a …rm speci…c productivity/demand shock, it .
Let t index time, and consider shocks hitting the economy between periods t 1 and t: It will be convenient to convert all variables to log form, with lower case alphabets representing the log of respective upper case variables. 5 The dynamics for productivity and cost of capital are given by:
where it has a symmetric distribution with positive mean, and t > 0 is an economy wide constant. The economic shocks force …rms to re-evaluate their …rst order conditions, including demand for external …nancing.
(i) Case I: No External Financing Constraints
If a …rm is unconstrained, then credit limits are not relevant. This will be the case when either c i or W i is large. For an unconstrained …rm, the change in (log of) bank debt is simply given by,
where ( it + t ) is the "net demand"shock hitting a …rm. The change in debt is proportional to the elasticity of capital, , and is the joint result of a movement along the marginal product curve due to the price drop t , and a shift in the marginal product curve due to the productivity shock it .
shocks, all we need is for the production function to have diminishing returns at the margin.
(ii) Case II: External Financing Constraints
In contrast, the change in bank debt for …rms that face borrowing constraints will not only depend on the size and direction of net demand shock ( it + t ) as before, but also on the …rm's initial "…nancial slack." We de…ne …nancial slack as s i;t 1 = d i;t 1 d i;t 1 ; i.e. the (log) distance between the credit limit of a …rm and its actual bank borrowing.
Speci…cally; to the extent that the process of setting credit limits is not fully forward looking and the growth in investment needs outstrips the growth in pledge-able assets that determine the credit limit, a …rm's borrowing will be constrained by how much …nancial slack it has.
This is because the …rm is unable to borrow beyond its credit limit and the limit does not adjust quickly enough to cater to the increased demand. This "stickiness" in the credit limit is a natural consequence of the nature of …nancial frictions: The ex-post enforcement concern implies that a …rm's debt capacity is a function of its existing reputation, c i ; and total wealth,
Since both these variables change slowly over time, it is reasonable to assume that credit limit will not increase as rapidly as required under a large net positive demand shock.
While we will provide direct evidence that credit limit setting is indeed backward looking and credit limits are quite sticky in section III, for the purposes of tractability we will assume here that credit limit is …xed in the short run. However, as we have discussed, the predictability of …nancial slack for future borrowing holds as long as credit limits are su¢ ciently sticky. More formally, we obtain the following result:
Result 1: Assuming the …rm speci…c demand/productivity shock it is uncorrelated with initial …nancial slackness s i;t 1 , the change in bank debt varies positively with s i;t 1 if and only if …rms face borrowing constraints.
While the proof is relegated to the appendix, Figure IV o¤ers a simple illustration. The x-axis traces the magnitude of the net demand shock, and the y-axis represents the actual change in a …rm's bank debt. The unconstrained …rm's borrowing change, as given in equation (4), is represented by a line of slope passing through the origin (line A). In contrast, the change in borrowing for a constrained …rm is capped by how much …nancial slack they have, as
represented by the dashed line B for a …rm with some positive slack. 6 Figure IV shows that if …rms are unconstrained, they can borrow as much as they desire and in particular, …nancial slackness plays no role. However, a constrained …rm's borrowing will vary positively with the extent of their …nancial slackness. This is easiest to see for large enough demand shocks where all …rms will only be able to expand borrowing to exactly as much as their limit allows.
C. Base Empirical Speci…cation
Given Result 1, we can run the following empirical speci…cation to test for borrowing constraints:
where 4d Moreover, as is clear from the …gure, one would not expect a slope of 1 since some …rms may simply not have enough of a credit demand to have the limit constraint bind.
While in theory one could estimate (5) in any time period, the ability to capture the underlying …nancial constraint on the average …rm is much better in the face of large and positive demand shocks such as those implied by 9/11. In other words, if the positive demand shock curve C. The response to negative shocks for such …rms is also muted since they were not borrowing as much as they would have liked in period t 1:
is small, then despite …rms facing borrowing constraints, the typical …rm may still be able to borrow as much as it desires since it has enough slack. In terms of Line B in Figure IV , such a …rm would be moving along the (initial) 45 0 line and not hitting its limit.
Therefore our primary speci…cation will be the cross-sectional equivalent of (5), where we collapse the …rm data into two time-periods -a pre-and a post-period, respectively several quarters before and after 9/11. Our dependent variable is the (log) change in a …rm's (average) borrowing over the two periods and s i;t 1 is the …rm's …nancial slack right before 9/11. This time-collapsing of data has the advantage of reducing noise and also our standard errors are robust to concerns of auto-correlation (see Bertrand, Du ‡o and Mullainathan, 2004). Moreover, since we still have quarters before the "pre-period," we can construct and control for lagged values (i.e. values in the "pre-pre-periods"). Finally, while we have imposed a linear relationship
in (5), we shall also estimate the relationship between a …rm's change in borrowing and its preshock …nancial slack non-parametrically.
D. Further Predictions
The preceding analysis implies additional comparative statics results with respect to the size of demand shocks and the severity of credit limit constraints. These are summarized below.
Result 2: Suppose the …rm speci…c demand/productivity shock it is uncorrelated with initial …nancial slackness s i;t 1 . Then the sensitivity between change in bank debt and s i;t 1 (i.e. 1 ) is greater for …rms with larger demand shocks and …rms with stricter borrowing constraints.
The …rst part of the result holds since lending di¤erences between …rms with di¤erent values of s i;t 1 are larger if the desired growth in credit demand is higher. Conversely, if this change is small, it will only constrain the borrowing of …rms that have little or no …nancial slack left, whereas all other …rms (with di¤ering …nancial slack) will not be constrained and will be able to borrow as much as they need. The second part follows from the discussion earlier that showed that 1 goes to zero for …rms without any credit limit constraints. We can test result 2 by modifying equation (5) to:
where X i is a …rm attribute such as the industry demand shock as a result of 9/11, or a proxy (e.g. size) for a …rm's credit limit constraints.
E. Identi…cation Concerns
The …rst-di¤erence speci…cation in (5) has the advantage that it completely absorbs …rm-level unobservables such as initial productivity ( i;t 1 ) and …nancial frictions (! i ). However identi…cation issues arise if a …rm's initial …nancial slack is correlated with unobserved time-varying factors, such as …rm productivity shocks ( it ); 8 that in ‡uence its loan growth i.e. if Corr (s i;t 1 ; " it ) 6 = 0. The primary concern is that Corr (s i;t 1 ; " it ) > 0 which would bias our estimate of 1 upwards.
Before addressing such concerns we should note that there are legitimate scenarios that would produce a negative correlation between s i;t 1 and " it , and thus bias 1 downwards. For example, …rms that bene…t more from the improving economic environment (i.e. …rms with larger it ) may have a higher productivity and hence greater loan demand even prior to 9/11.
This would make them more likely to have smaller pre-9/11 slack s i;t 1 : Similarly, if demand shocks are positively correlated (e.g. a …rm is in a growing sector), then …rms with smaller slack will be the ones with higher future loan demand.
Now consider scenarios that would produce a positive correlation between s i;t 1 and " it .
First, it is possible that …nancial slack in t 1 is spuriously correlated with future credit growth due to mean reversion in loan demand. For example, suppose that the average loan demand is …xed for a …rm over time but there are idiosyncratic shocks to demand each period.
Then …rms that experience low demand in period t 1 will have high s i;t 1 , and are also more likely (on average) to receive a larger loan demand shock in period t: Mean reversion in loan demand therefore arti…cially creates a positive correlation between …nancial slack and loan growth. However, since we observe credit growth over a long period of time, we can directly control (and check) for mean reversion in our sample.
A related cause for spurious correlation between s i;t 1 and subsequent credit growth is forward looking credit limits. For example, suppose …rms correctly anticipate increases in future loan demand and convince their lenders to provide them with greater current …nancial slack. Then s i;t 1 and it will be positively correlated. However, the 9/11 shock was large and completely unanticipated, making it unlikely that …rms or banks could forecast the coming boom.
While the 9/11 shock was unanticipated, one may still be concerned that if higher quality …rms generically perform better, then such …rms will have a greater "option value"in retaining …nancial slack. To the extent that banks also recognize this, these …rms will be able to obtain greater …nancial slack and also borrow more during 9/11. More generally, banks may provide higher credit limits and hence more slack to better quality …rms because these …rms are expected to grow faster. We address such …rm quality concerns in a series of tests detailed in section IV B.
These tests explicitly control for …rm quality using parametric and non-parametric techniques.
They show that the …nancial slack e¤ect is robust to including direct measures of …rm quality such as past performance, and to introducing common director/…rm …xed e¤ects.
III Data
The banking sector in Pakistan is liberalized and fairly representative of emerging markets. In terms of data quality, our personal examination of the collection and compilation procedures, as well as consistency checks on the data suggest that it is of very good quality. CIB was part of a large e¤ort by the central bank to set up a reliable information sharing resource 16 that all banks could access. Perhaps the most credible signal of data quality is the fact that all local and foreign banks refer to information in CIB on a daily basis to verify the credit history of prospective borrowers. We checked with one of the largest and most pro…table private banks in Pakistan and found that they use CIB information about prospective borrowers explicitly in their internal credit scoring models. We also ran several internal consistency tests on the data such as aggregation checks, and found the data to be of excellent quality. As a random check, we also con…rmed the authenticity of the data from a bank branch by comparing it to the portfolio of that branch's loan o¢ cer. Table I presents summary statistics for our main variables of interest in the loan-level data set. Statistics are averaged at the …rm-level separately for two pre and one post-9/11 periods that comprise 6 quarters each. 9 The loan level data is …rst aggregated up to the …rm-level and then time averages are taken after converting all values to real 1995 rupees. Our sample is restricted to …rms that were not in default at the time of the 9/11 shock, and borrowed for at least two quarters in the pre and post-9/11 period. The former restriction allows us to focus on "active performing loans," while the latter provides more precise estimates. The two quarter restriction excludes only 2% of …rms, and does not qualitatively a¤ect our results. The sample selection criteria gives us a …nal sample of 22,485 …rms.
A. Financial Slack
Financial slack is de…ned as the (log)di¤erence between a …rm's credit limit as set by its bank, and the outstanding loan amount. Credit limit, i.e. D i in section II's terminology, is determined by a bank after reviewing the …rm's …nancial history and collateral. A useful feature of loan …nancing in Pakistan is that a …rm can costlessly borrow up to its credit limit. This free option value of credit limits implies that …rms generally try to get as large a credit limit as possible.
Thus a credit line is bounded only by a bank's perception of a …rm's debt capacity, which is precisely what we want to measure from a theoretical perspective. We construct the distance between a …rm's credit limit and its actual borrowing prior to 9/11 (i.e. s i;t 1 ) for all private …rms in Pakistan. A limitation regarding the credit limit variable is that it was not collected by SBP after the …rst half of 2001 due to a format change in the data that banks had to report, in which several other reported variables were also dropped/added. Hence we do not have credit limit data after 9/11. However, as the conceptual framework highlighted, it is the pre-9/11 credit limit that is critical for conducting our empirical tests.
Slack "Stickiness"
The borrowing constraints formalized in section II arise if credit limits are "sticky."i.e. not fully forward looking. While estimating a positive coe¢ cient on …nancial slack in speci…cation (5) provides evidence for such stickiness, in this section we also provide direct evidence on the backward-looking process of setting credit limits and the observed stickiness of such limits.
Our examination is also consistent with evidence from other emerging markets, such as India The backward-looking nature of determinants of credit limit are not surprising once one considers the central bank's prudential regulations that provide strict guidelines to banks in terms of how credit limits should be set. These guidelines are very conservative in terms of collateral requirements, and bind a …rm's credit limit to its past cash- ‡ows. For example, total unsecured lending for a given …rm cannot exceed Rs. 500,000 (about $8,500). A …rm's total debt cannot exceed four times its total equity, and a …rm's current assets to current liability ratio cannot drop below 0.75.
While all banks must comply with these conservative regulations, banks often voluntarily impose even harsher collateral and …nancial ratio restrictions, such as historical cash- ‡ow to debt service not dropping below a threshold. Similarly, bank manuals emphasize that collateral must have high liquidation value and preferably be very liquid. For example, the following quote comes from one of the bank's manuals, "(the applicant must provide) liquid and readily convertible security with more than adequate margin; readily marketable collateral fully under bank's control having high value which can withstand volatile market conditions." Table II (a) provides direct evidence for the conservative, asset-backed and backward-looking credit limit policies by providing the composition of collateral for bank loans in pre and post-9/11 periods. First, unsecured lending comprises only 1% of total lending in the banking sector. Second, the majority of lending is securitized with "hard" assets such as …xed assets, merchandise (which is also fairly liquid), and real estate. Finally, column (2) shows that despite the large net positive demand shock due to 9/11, there is virtually no e¤ect on the composition of collateral.
Panel A in Table II(b) shows how …nancial slack is correlated with …rm attributes. Consistent with sticky credit limits, …nancial slack is tighter if previous credit growth was high.
Similarly, consistent with the notion that smaller …rms are more credit constrained, smaller …rms have tighter …nancial slack. However, …nancial slack is not correlated with …rm attributes that likely re ‡ect …rm quality, such as its past default history (twice lagged default rate), export status, or with whether the …rm was in an industry that experienced substantial growth after Another test for the stickiness of credit limits is to check if limits respond to positive demand shocks. We can only conduct such a test in the pre-9/11 sample when we have data on credit limits. Column (1) in panel C shows that credit limit does not increase relatively more for …rms in industries that experienced a net positive growth over the pre-9/11 period. This suggests the process of updating credit limits is not very responsive to a …rm's future growth potential.
Column (2) shows that the …rms we identi…ed as belonging to positive growth industries indeed had somewhat higher loan growth (although likely muted due to the credit constraint limits).
Thus consistent with sticky credit limits, …nancial slack gets relatively tighter for …rms with better growth opportunities which would bias estimates of the …nancial slack e¤ect downwards.
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IV Results: Financial Slack and Borrowing
A. Primary Speci…cation
Before presenting results from the primary cross-sectional speci…cation, we illustrate the result graphically in the time-series. Figure VI shows how the overall borrowing varies over time between …rms that had "low" and "high" slack at the time the 9/11 shock hit. The …gure categorizes …rms based on whether they are below or above median …nancial slack at the time of 9/11. We also demean a …rm's borrowing in a given quarter by its borrowing in the quarter prior to 9/11. Thus the vertical axis represents a …rm's borrowing relative to 9/11.
Figure VI not only illustrates our main …nding, but also lends credence to our identi…cation assumption. The …gure shows that there is no discernible di¤erence in borrowing between high and low slack …rms prior to 9/11. However, right after 9/11, the two lines start diverging and the di¤erence between them becomes statistically signi…cant. 10 The …nancial slack e¤ect is captured by the di¤erence in borrowing levels between the two types of …rms after 9/11. The lack of di¤erence between the two prior to 9/11 indicates that the post 9/11 divergence is not a result of any pre-existing trends or because …rms that were high-slack at the time of the 9/11 shock were systematically di¤erent from low slack …rms.
We now turn to our primary cross-sectional speci…cation and estimate (5) in the timeaveraged data with one post-9/11 and one pre-9/11 period. Figure VII …rst presents the nonparametric kernel plot of the relationship between lending growth over the 9/11 period and initial …nancial slack, and shows a monotonically increasing trend, suggesting the presence of borrowing constraints. While the relationship is mostly linear, as one would expect, the graph does seem to ‡atten out at high values of …nancial slack. 11 Table III presents the primary regression results. The dependent variable is a …rm's borrowing growth over the post and pre-9/11 periods and the variable of interest is the coe¢ cient on a …rm's initial (pre-9/11 period) …nancial slack. Column (1) shows that a 1% increase in a …rm's …nancial slack pre-9/11 leads to a 0.21% increase in its loan growth and the result is signi…cant at the 1% level. Column (2) shows that this e¤ect is robust to non-parametrically 1 0 Drawing con…dence intervals around both lines (not shown to avoid cluttering the …gure) show that while the con…dence intervals over-lap pre-9/11, they do not do so post-9/11. 1 1 The initial part of the graph is also somewhat ‡atter suggesting that there may be some "lumpiness" in the investment decision i.e. …rms with small amounts of slack don't (slightly) increase borrowing since the amount may be below the minimum needed to make the investment.
allowing for di¤erences across …rm location, industry, and lead-bank …xed e¤ects. There are a total of 134 city, 75 industry and 119 lead-bank …xed e¤ects. While the initial …nancial slack measure used in Table III is averaged over the previous three quarters, our results are robust to averaging the slack measure even if we average over somewhat shorter or longer time periods.
Section II highlighted the identi…cation concern that the results in column (1) and (2) might be driven by mean reversion. Column (3) tests for this by controlling for a …rm's lagged loan growth prior to 9/11 and shows that while there is mean reversion (the coe¢ cient on the lagged growth rate is negative), the coe¢ cient of interest on …nancial slack does not change at all. In fact Column (4) shows that the small drop in the coe¢ cient in column (3) is due to a reduction in sample size (lagged loan growth is missing for …rms that do not have a su¢ ciently long history prior to 9/11). Columns (5) and (6) do the same by introducing an additional lag.
An alternate speci…cation to check mean reversion is to control for the initial level of borrowing. Column (7) does so and shows that the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack remains unchanged.
To the extent that future loan demand is correlated with past growth, these tests also allay concerns that the relationship may be driven by expected loan growth concerns. 12 The test in column (7) can also be seen as an "over-identi…cation"test. Since …nancial slack is de…ned as credit limit less actual borrowing, one concern could be that slack is proxying for one of its two components, i.e. the variation we are picking up is not in the di¤ erence between limit and borrowing, but in either one of the two. For example, if credit limit is similar for all …rms then the variation in …nancial slack is really driven by di¤erences in a …rm's initial borrowing.
Alternately, we may be concerned that the slack result is really picking up variation in credit limit across …rms as one may expect if the expected loan growth concerns were important i.e. a …rm which expected to grow in future would demand greater credit limits now. Neither of the two would be consistent with our theoretical predictions, which posit that a …rm's ability to grow under …nancial constraints is limited by its available slack (not the level of initial borrowing or the credit limit). 1 2 An alternate test for expected credit growth concerns is to make an extreme assumption that apart from 9/11, all changes in other time periods were entirely driven by anticipation e¤ects. Examining …gure 1(d) shows that the largest interest rate drop apart from 9/11 occurred during the …rst half of 2000. Thus the maximum anticipation e¤ect would likely be over this period. Estimating the …nancial slack e¤ect for this period shows that it is signi…cantly smaller -almost a third -of the …nancial slack e¤ect we …nd during 9/11. Thus even if we "net out" the maximum …nancial slack e¤ect over any other (anticipated) period, we still …nd that the 9/11 slack e¤ect is large and signi…cant, suggesting that anticipation e¤ects are unlikely to be a primary driver of our results.
Thus one way to test for such concerns is to control for either of the two components of …nancial slack and ensure that the slack result is robust to this. Column (7) already showed that this is indeed the case for initial (log) borrowing. Column (8) instead includes initial (log) credit limit as a control and again shows that the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack is una¤ected.
Finally, another somewhat mechanical concern may be that our results are confounded by strategic delay considerations, i.e. banks are worried about the uncertain situation due to 9/11. For example, they may fear that the newfound liquidity is temporary and prone to ‡ight back. Thus they may hesitate to make longer terms loans against this potentially short term availability of liquidity and this concern may be more salient for low-slack …rms.
However, we feel this concern is unlikely given that our data spans a year and a half after 9/11 and the liquidity situation cleared up pretty soon after 9/11. Moreover, the drop in interest rates was permanent and interest rates stayed low for a while. Nevertheless, even under such circumstances, banks should at least be willing to extend short-term working capital loans if …rm collateral constraints are not binding. We therefore re-run speci…cation (5) using only short-term working capital loans. Column (9) shows that the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack hardly changes (in fact the point estimate is larger) suggesting that strategic delay / hesitancy by banks to extend credit is unlikely to explain our results.
B. Robustness Checks -Firm Quality
We now check for the concern highlighted in section II D that …nancial slack may re ‡ect unobserved …rm quality due to such …rms having greater anticipated demand or a higher option value of retaining …nancial slack. We should note though that Table IIb shows that …nancial slack at the time of 9/11 is negatively correlated with prior credit growth. Since better quality …rms are likely to have higher growth in credit demand, if anything …nancial slack would be negatively correlated with …rm quality, leading to an underestimate of the true …nancial slack e¤ect. Nonetheless, we check directly for the concern that …nancial slack and …rm quality may be positively corrected.
Our …rst check uses the default history of …rms in the pre-9/11 period as a measure of …rm quality. Recall that our sample was selected on …rms that were not in default in the quarters immediately preceding 9/11. However, some …rms may have entered default temporarily in the periods prior to this. We therefore compute the average default rate in the "pre-pre-9/11"period 22 as a measure of …rm quality and include it as a control in column (1) of Table IV . The coe¢ cient on this twice-lagged default rate in column (1) is negative, indicating that past default history is indeed correlated with lower credit growth post-9/11 and therefore a plausible measure of …rm quality. However, the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack hardly changes with the inclusion of this …rm quality control.
We next use a non-parametric measure of …rm quality based on a …rm's directorship. Using the identity of the board of directors for every …rm in our sample, we create "common director" groups such that two …rms are linked together if they have a common director. We then put in common director …xed e¤ects in our main speci…cation, thereby only comparing within sets of two or more …rms that share a director but di¤er in their initial …nancial slack. Since the majority of …rms in our sample are owned by the directors themselves, the identity of directors is likely to be a key determinant of …rm quality. Therefore including common director …xed e¤ects controls for all time-invariant factors, such as …rm quality or business and political in ‡uence, that are common to a …rm's owner.
We restrict our attention to the subset of …rms that have at least one other …rm with whom they share management, since including …rms in single management groups are completely absorbed by the director …xed e¤ect. Column (2) repeats our standard speci…cation on this sub-sample and shows that the main e¤ect remains unchanged. Column (3) then includes common director …xed e¤ects (total of 4,922 FEs) and shows that our coe¢ cient of interest remains unchanged. Columns (4)-(5) take this a step further and only consider …rms that form common director groups of two to three …rms. Thus the common director …xed e¤ects absorb a lot more of the overall sub-sample variation in column (5). However, the results are even stronger, once again con…rming that it is unlikely that …rm quality is spuriously generating the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack.
The regressions so far have been run at the …rm level, i.e. we aggregated loan level data for a given …rm across all banking relationships. This was because the theory was based on credit limit constraints at the …rm level. However, if credit limit constraints are binding at the …rm level, then there is also a loan level credit allocation prediction that we can test. In particular, suppose credit limit is …xed at the …rm level for reasons discussed in section II, and total credit limit for a …rm is divided across two banks. The two banks are aware of each other's credit limits through the central database, thus making sure that their combined limit does not exceed a …rm's aggregate debt capacity (D in section II). If a …rm does not use its credit limits proportionately from the two banks, there will be di¤ering …nancial slacks from the two banks at the time of 9/11. Therefore, in the face of a positive credit demand shock 9/11, a …rm will borrow relatively more from the bank with greater …nancial slack. This is the within …rm credit allocation prediction that we test in column (6) .
A key advantage of the credit allocation prediction is that it allows one to use …rm …xed e¤ects and hence absorb any di¤erences in …rm quality and …rm speci…c shocks to credit demand.
The result con…rms the credit allocation prediction as a …rm borrows relatively more from the bank it has greater …nancial slack with prior to 9/11 shock. Column (6) is naturally restricted to …rms with multiple banking relationships, and a unit of observation represents a loan, i.e. a …rm-bank pair. While the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack is smaller, this is entirely due to the sample restriction as column (7) shows. Column (7) repeats the test without …rm …xed e¤ects and shows that our standard e¤ect is smaller on this sub-sample. The reduction in …nancial slack e¤ect is due to the fact that multiple relationship …rms tend to be larger in size. We explore the size heterogeneity in greater detail in the next section.
An alternate strategy to include …rm-…xed e¤ects while still examining overall borrowing would be to estimate an analogous speci…cation to (5) in the time-series by utilizing other time periods apart from 9/11. While the …nancial slack e¤ect remains just as large if we were to do so, we do not present the results from this speci…cation since it necessitates exploiting changes over non-9/11 time-periods as well and this raises signi…cant concerns that the results will be confounded by anticipation e¤ects. An empirical strength of our study is to exploit the fact that the economy experienced a large and clearly unanticipated (positive) liquidity shock during 9/11 and our results are more compelling precisely because they only exploit this unexpected change -including other time-periods would undermine this.
The results in Tables III and IV provide compelling evidence that …rms are indeed credit constrained -banks are unable to increase lending to these …rms in the face of a drop in the cost of capital and a positive demand shock, due to an inability to increase credit limits as quickly.
We now explore whether this result varies across di¤erent …rm types, and in doing so provide further support for our identi…cation.
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V Results: Heterogeneity
Result 2 in section II showed that …rms facing large demand shocks and/or greater credit constraints are likely to show a larger …nancial slack e¤ect. This section explores these predictions.
A. Demand Shocks
While 9/11 was a positive demand shock on average, it a¤ected industries di¤erentially. Specifically, the building materials, construction, energy, and petroleum sectors received a disproportionately larger boom due to reconstruction e¤orts in Afghanistan. In contrast, industries such as textiles and chemicals did not enjoy such a large boom. The sectoral level ranking is based on changes in sector-speci…c GDP growth rates over this period. This heterogeneity allows us to categorize …rms as facing high or low demand shocks due to 9/11, based on the demand shock experienced by their industry.
For …rms that receive low demand shocks, the di¤erence in lending between those closer to their credit limit as compared to those further away will be small, since even those closer to the limit may have enough slack to obtain their desired increase in borrowing. As such the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack in speci…cation (5) will be small. However, for …rms experiencing a large demand shock, it is likely that only those …rms with substantial …nancial slack will be able to obtain their desired …nancing -the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack will be large.
The results in Table V show that this is indeed the case. Columns (1)-(2) separately estimate speci…cation (5) for …rms experiencing relatively high and low demand shocks. The main e¤ect of high demand shock industries is 0.22, whereas it is only 0.11 for low demand shock industries. Column (3) pools the two types of …rms and shows that the di¤erence between the two is statistically signi…cant. Column (4) ensures that the result is robust to industry, location, and lead-bank …xed e¤ects. Finally, column (5) includes …rm size decile dummies interacted with …nancial slack to ensure that the demand shock heterogeneity is not driven by comparisons across di¤erent …rm sizes.
B. Firm Type
If loan growth responsiveness to initial …nancial slack is re ‡ective of credit constraints, one would expect this response to be higher for …rms facing greater credit constraints. We explore 25 this heterogeneity along two …rm characteristics -size and whether a …rm exports or not.
Size
We divide …rms into two sizes based on whether their total borrowing pre-9/11 is above or below the median. The results in Column (1) of Table VI show that smaller …rms tend to be more credit constrained than larger ones as the coe¢ cient on a …rm's initial …nancial slack is smaller for the larger …rms. Column (2) shows that this e¤ect is robust to non-parametrically allowing for di¤erences across …rm location, industry, and lead-bank …xed e¤ects. In addition, by also including industry …xed e¤ects interacted with initial …nancial slack (Column (3)), we ensure that the e¤ect is not driven by comparing …rms in di¤erent industries, since …rm size may vary across industries. Figure VIII presents the results for a …ner …rm size classi…cation where we group …rms into size deciles. Each point is the coe¢ cient on initial …nancial slack for …rms of a given decile. The …gure shows a clear trend by initial borrowing size, i.e. as …rms get larger, they are less constrained in their borrowing by their initial …nancial slack.
Exporters
If there is a set of …rms that do not face constraints in increasing their credit limit, then the theory implies a simple falsi…cation test: the …nancial slack e¤ect should be zero for such …rms. A look at lending guidelines of various banks, as well as prudential regulations shows that exporting …rms are a lot less likely to face binding credit limit constraints. 13 The reason for this is that future export sales of exporting …rms are easily pledgeable, while the same is not true for other …rms. Export orders from abroad are often coming from reputable international …rms, or backed by foreign banks. Thus banks are willing to lend against expected export orders from say Levi's, but not against future sales growth in the local market.
The relaxation of lending rules for exporters suggests that exporting …rms will be less constrained by balance sheet variables. Exporters may therefore be able to expand as much as needed when faced with a positive demand shock, regardless of their …nancial slack at the time of the shock. Columns (4) and (5) in Table VI show that this is indeed the case. We split our sample and estimate the primary speci…cation (5) separately for non-exporters and exporters.
Column (4) shows the same large e¤ect on non-exporters, but Column (5) shows that exporting …rms show no correlation between initial …nancial slack and future borrowing (both the point estimate and standard errors are small).
Column (6) shows the same result but in the pooled sample where we interact initial …nancial slack with a …rm being a non-exporter. Column (7) shows that this e¤ect is robust to nonparametrically allowing for di¤erences across …rm location, industry, and lead-bank …xed e¤ects.
Column (8) takes a further step to ensure that the e¤ect is not driven by comparing …rms of di¤erent sizes, since one may be concerned that exporters are larger than non-exporters. We do so by not only including dummies for each …rm decile but interacting each of these with initial …nancial slack. The coe¢ cient on …nancial slack for non-exporting …rms remains large and signi…cant.
Since 9/11 led to an appreciation of the currency, one may worry that exporters received a negative terms of trade shock and this made …nancial slack less relevant as a constraint on growth. However, the removal of …nancial sanctions post-9/11 created a boost for exporters and the next impact on exporters was positive, as the evidence in Figure II While we would expect a smaller/no e¤ect of initial …nancial slack on unconstrained …rms under this hypothesis (result 2), alternate explanations do not readily generate such heterogeneity. For example, if the results are driven by mean reversion or anticipation/option value e¤ects due to unobserved …rm quality, it is likely that such factors are just as important for exporters/larger …rms. 14 
C. Bank Type
Does the degree of credit limit constraints, and hence …nancial slack e¤ect, vary across bank types? Table VII separates loans made by government, private domestic and foreign banks.
Since our primary speci…cation is run at the …rm level, we assign …rms with multiple banks to their lead bank. Column (1) shows that there is hardly any di¤erence in the coe¢ cient on …nancial slack across the three bank types. As we add more …rm-level controls (Columns (2) and (3)), we get slightly larger coe¢ cients on private domestic and foreign banks suggesting that if anything, they are likely to be more conservative than government banks. However, both the magnitude and statistical signi…cance of these results is weak. Finally, Column (4) repeats this test at the loan-level, thus exploiting cross-bank di¤erences within the same …rm (i.e. using …rm …xed e¤ects), and also …nds little di¤erence across bank types.
An alternate source of variation across banks is bank liquidity as measured by their deposit growth. The bank-lending channel literature suggests that banks that face lower liquidity cut back lending more. Conversely one may think that more liquid banks would not be constrained in their lending. However, as we argue in the conclusion, the mechanism behind this paperconstraints on the lending side -are just as likely to hold for liquid banks. Exploring speci…ca-tions similar to those in Table VII (regressions not shown) show that the …nancial slack e¤ect is the same for banks with varying liquidity. In other words even banks that see large liquidity gains display as large of a …nancial slack e¤ect.
These results suggest that speci…c form of constraints we have identi…ed arise more due to common factors such as the legal and regulatory environment, rather than variation in bank organizational structures or available liquidity, that may make them conservative and sluggish (see Stein, 2002 ).
VI The "Real" Costs of Financing Constraints
The results so far o¤er evidence for how backward-looking credit limit constraints limit the absorptive capacity of an economy. What are the real costs of such constraints? In other words, how much real output did not get realized because banks in Pakistan were unable to fully pass on the positive …nancial shock after 9/11 to borrowing …rms? While answering this question is extremely challenging and beyond the scope of this paper, even a tentative back of the envelope calculation based on the micro-evidence is quite revealing.
To estimate the aggregate return on credit not lent to …rms due to credit limit constraints, we need the amount of such "missed lending"as well as the opportunity cost of missed lending.
Suppose that …rms with …nancial slack s i;t 1 equal or greater than 1 are completely unconstrained (10.6% of all …rms), i.e. they can borrow as much as they like, given the range of shocks experienced as a result of 9/11. 15 We can then compute missing loans as follows. Con-sider a …rm with a given s i;t 1 ; and loan size, L i;t 1 : Take the estimated coe¢ cient b 1 to be 0.2. Since we assume that s i;t 1 = 1 re ‡ects unconstrained growth and …gure VII shows a fairly linear relationship, the unconstrained growth of …rm i would have been (1 s i;t 1 ) 0:2: The total missing loan is then (L i;t 1 (1 s i;t 1 ) 0:2): Since the estimated b 1 also varies by …rm size decile signi…cantly, it is better to allow for this heterogeneity. Total missing loans (M L) are then given by the sum: 16
for …rm i in size decile j: Computing this in our sample, gives us a total of 45.4 billion rupees in missing loans.
Second, we need to impute the rate of return on this missed lending. While one could make di¤erent assumptions about this return, it is simpler to present a higher bound where the unlent amount is assumed to generate zero net returns, i.e. the economy just gains the book value. The investment distortion is therefore losing future streams of income generated had the amount been lent to …rms. Given the market price of a …rm re ‡ects the present value of its underlying assets, we can impute this net present value by subtracting book from market value.
Using this approach and a Market to Book ratio for Pakistan estimated at 2.96 (IFC emerging market database -EMDB), we get the net present value of the return to the missed investment would have been Rs.. 45.4*1.96=88.9 billion rupees, or 2.3% of GDP in 2000.
We should caution that these estimates are very tentative and meant more for the sake of illustration. They are also likely to su¤er from biases that could both over or underestimate the true e¤ect. In estimating the amount of missed lending, while we were conservative in assuming that …rms with slack greater than one were completely unconstrained, we assumed that …rms could not compensate with informal/internal sources of capital. In the unlikely case that …rms can generate their desired capital from such alternate sources at equal cost, there would be no real impact on the economy.
However, Table VIII provides evidence that …rms are unable to fully compensate. Keeping the same sample of …rms we have in our primary speci…cation (non-defaulters), we ask whether no longer …nancially constrained is to see if loan growth "levels o¤" in the …gure. This only really happens for …rms with slack higher than 2 suggesting our cuto¤ of 1 is quite conservative. 1 6 When (1-s) is negative for a …rm, we set it equal to zero …rms that are constrained in the sense of facing less …nancial slack, are relatively more likely to default post-9/11. Column (1) shows that this is indeed the case -going from no slack to a slack of 1 lowers the likelihood of …rm default by 0.03 percentage points. As a percent of mean default rates for these set of …rms, this represents a 50% increase in default rates. Columns (2)- (3) show the result is robust to additional controls. We should note that the likely interpretation of this result is not that a lack of …nancial slack induces the …rm to enter bankruptcy, but that …rms with …nancial slack are in a better position to take advantage of the new growth opportunities due to the availability of external …nancing. They are consequently less likely to enter …nancial distress going forward.
Finally, columns (4)- (5) present evidence on the relative importance of internal credit markets. We focus on …rms that are in common-ownership groups (as in Table IV ) and ask how much the default rate e¤ect falls once we include common director …xed e¤ects. This o¤ers an indirect test of the importance of internal (to the management group) credit markets. Our results suggest that at best such markets can compensate for half the loss a …rm faces dues to its credit limit constraints. Since the majority of …rms do not belong to management groups, this suggests that even if internal credit markets can serve to lessen the real costs of the credit constraints identi…ed, these costs will remain substantial. 17 While we had previously shown the robustness of our results to unobserved …rm quality concerns, one may question whether the …nancial distress results re ‡ect this concern. This is not the case since the default measure being considered in Table VIII is future and not past default. If this result indeed re ‡ected unobserved …rm quality, we would have expected that initial …nancial slack would be correlated with past default and thus spuriously generate the results in Table VIII . Our previous results show that not only is the main speci…cation robust to introducing such past default history as a control (Column 1, Table IV) but that …nancial slack is not even correlated with past default history (Table IIb) . Thus analogous regressions to those in Table VIII (not shown) show that using past (rather then future) default history show no signi…cant e¤ect of …nancial slack.
While the cost estimates are clearly tentative, they are likely to be under-estimates since 1 7 While one may question whether …rm default is a good measure of real outcomes (…rms may strategically default), in a related paper on Pakistan, Zia (2007) uses real output data to arrive at a similar conclusion. He shows that …rm-level exports decline once banks restrict credit (previously o¤ered under an export incentive scheme) to …rms. Those …rms that are able to retain output, do so only because they can borrow more from other banks, rather than drawing on informal/internal capital sources. not only would one expect the rates of return to be higher for constrained …rms, but additional costs arise due to the distributional consequences of …nancial constraints. These distributional implications arise as smaller …rms face more borrowing constraints, allowing larger and possibly not as e¢ cient …rms to survive at the expense of smaller more innovative ones.
VII Conclusion
Our results show that banks are constrained in their willingness to lend to …rms due to agency The bank level friction binds when banks are hit with a negative liquidity shock, while the …rm level friction binds on the upside. Faced with a negative liquidity shock, banks are unable to borrow from external sources, and hence have to cut back on lending. In the event of a positive liquidity shock, while banks have su¢ cient liquidity, they are constrained by the "debt capacity" of …rms. As our theoretical section outlined, such …rm borrowing limits are the natural outcome of agency issues between the bank and …rms. 18 Since bank level frictions bite on the downside and …rm level frictions bite on the upside, excessive volatility in liquidity can be especially costly for underdeveloped …nancial markets.
We would like to emphasize that our results do not necessarily imply that either banks or bank regulators are ine¢ cient. As the theoretical framework illustrates, the decision by banks not to expand beyond a …rm's credit limit is constrained e¢ cient. Agency frictions force banks to rely on a …rm's supply of collateralizable assets. Similarly, central banks may impose collateral requirements to ensure that moral hazard does not drive banks to ignore agency concerns vis a vis borrowing …rms. The more lax regulation for exporting …rms may also be justi…ed on the grounds that future export sales are much easier to verify and hence pledge against. However, since the fundamental constraint is driven by agency frictions, economy wide e¤orts to relax such frictions -such as improvements in rule of law and transparency -should make banks less reliant on collateral based lending and increase e¢ ciency (see Liberti and Mian, 2008 for evidence).
Finally, there may be further unwelcome implications of banks'inability to pass on positive …nancial shocks in emerging markets. Sudden liquidity surges may spur excessive speculation as was witnessed. As banks could not lend rapidly enough, investors in Pakistan quickly turned to other markets such as equity and real-estate, where prices increased sharply. In a two year period following 9/11 not only did the stock market index increase …ve-fold to an all time record high, but housing prices appreciated at well over a 100% a year. Evidence that this was a speculative bubble is becoming increasingly apparent with the recent collapse of the real estate market and a noticeable cooling o¤ in the equity markets. Such adverse consequences of capital surges are not unique to Pakistan: Rogo¤ & Reinhart (2008) show across a range of economies that run-ups in asset prices and subsequent …nancial crises are often precipitated by large capital in ‡ows.
shock (as we argue was the case after 9/11) and the …rm has to borrow $110, then the banks are not willing to lend the extra amount because the …rm does not have su¢ cient balance sheet assets, even though banks have su¢ cient liquidity (the result in this paper).
32
VIII Appendix
A. Solving for collateral requirement, ! i :
A …rm …nances its investment K i with external debt D i and internal wealth W i ; i.e. K i = D i + W i : Given the ex-post threat of strategic default, the following I.C. condition must be satis…ed for all …rms.
where R > 1 is gross lending interest rate. Condition (8) implies that for a given investment level K i ; a …rm must invest minimum internal funds given by,
A …rm would want to put in the minimum possible internal funds for diversi…cation reasons. Thus (9) holds in equilibrium, and we get
Since no …rm defaults in equilibrium, R is constant across all …rms.
B. Result 1:
First consider an unconstrained …rm. For this …rm its change in borrowing is given by:
= 0: Now consider a …rm that faces …nancial constraints. In this case the solution to the …rm's borrowing change in response to a net demand shock, illustrated in Figure I , can be written down more formally as:
What is of relevance to us though is that @ d it @s i;t 1 = 1 when e d it s i;t 1 ; and 0 otherwise.
Given a distribution for it with a CDF F (:) and using e d it = ( it + t ) this allows us to solve for the expected value of this gradient i.e.
C. Result 2:
If …rms are …nancially constrained, the previous proof shows that
Now consider two sets of …rms with di¤ering distribution of demand shocks. An easy way to parameterize …rms that faced more positive demand shocks is using FOSD i.e. F high (x) F low (x) 8 x. This immediately implies that
j low . For the second part of the result note that, all else being equal, …rms with stricter …nancial constraints i.e. a higher value of ! i ; will have lower credit limits D i and therefore lower s i;t 1 : Since
@ 2 s i;t 1 0 this in turn implies 
Figure IV: Relationship Between Change in Bank Debt and Credit Demand Shocks
Figure IV illustrates how bank-lending responds to shocks for constrained and unconstrained firms. The horizontal axis represents the magnitude of the net demand shock for a firm, and the y-axis represents the change in the firm's bank debt. Line A represents the relationship between demand shocks and change in bank debt for unconstrained firms. The path for constrained firms depends on their intial financial slack, s(i,t-1). Constrained firms with zero initial financial slack will be on path C, whereas those firms with positive slack will be on path B.
Figures V (a)-(b): Relationship Between Change in Bank Debt and Initial Financial Slack
Figure Va: No borrowing constraints
Figures Va-b plot the empirical relationship between change in bank debt and initial financial slack with and without borrowing constraints, based on a simulation exercise. The simulation was conducted using the actual distribution of initial financial slack, and plausible values of demand shocks. The dependent variable on these regressions is the first difference in log(loans) post-and pre-9/11 quarters. Initial Financial Slack is the log difference between a firm's credit limit and its borrowing for 6 quarters prior to 2001Q3. All regression coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level.
(1) (the "pre-9/11" period). Twice Lagged variables represent values averaged over the range 1998Q3-1999Q4 (the "pre-pre-9/11" period). Initial Financial Slack is the difference in logs between credit limit and actual borrowing in the pre-9/11 period. Twice Lagged Default Rate is the ratio of defaulted loans to total loans pre-pre-9/11 period. Credit Limit and thus Financial Slack data is not available for the post-9/11 period. This table characterizes the financial slack and credit limit variables. Panel A presents cross sectional correlations of Initial Financial Slack with various firm attributes. Initial Financial Slack is the log difference between a firm's credit limit and its borrowing in the pre-9/11 period. Lagged Loan Growth is the first difference in log(loans) between post-9/11 and pre-9/11 periods. Log Firm Size is the log of total loans. Exporting Firm is a dummy=1 if a firm is an exporter. Twice Lagged Default Rate is the average default rate of each firm in the pre-pre-9/11 period, and default rate is the ratio of defaulted loans to total loans. High Demand Shock Industry is a dummy=1 for industries including the cement, energy and construction sectors. Significance levels are indicated by the asterisks. Panels B establishes the "stickiness" of credit limits through a simple counting exercise, separately for small and large firms. Panel C examines the relative change in credit limit and loan growth around January 2000 for high demand shock industries (i.e. those that grew significantly during this period).
(1) These regressions test the relationship between loan growth and credit limit constraints. The dependent variable is the first difference in log(loans) between post-9/11 and pre-9/11 periods. Initial Financial Slack is the log difference between a firm's credit limit and its borrowing in the pre-9/11 period. Lagged Loan Growth is the first difference in log(loans) between pre-9/11 and pre-pre-9/11 periods. Twice Lagged Loan Growth is the first difference in log(loans) between the pre-pre-9/11 period and six quarters before 1998Q2. Lagged Log Loan Level is the log of loans in the pre-9/11 period. Lagged Log Credit Limit is the log of credit limits in the pre-9/11 period. Columns (1) -(2) present results for our full sample. Columns (3) -(4) restrict the sample to firms for whom lagged loan growth data is available. Columns (5) -(6) restrict the sample to firms for whom both lagged loan growth and twice lagged loan growth data is available. Column (9) restricts the LHS variable to only working capital loans. Regression specifications in columns (2) -(9) also include dummies for each of the 134 cities/towns firms are located in, 75 industry dummies, and 119 dominant bank dummies, where dominant bank is where each firm has the largest share of borrowing. Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the dominant bank level.
(1) (5)- (8) conduct the same comparison in the pooled data. The dependent variable is the first difference in log(loans) between post-9/11 and pre-9/11 periods. Initial Financial Slack is the log difference between a firm's credit limit and its borrowing in the pre-9/11 period. The specifications in columns (6)-(8) also include a Non-Exporting Firm dummy. The specifications in Columns (2) - (3) and (7) - (8) The dependent variable is the first difference in log(loans) between post-9/11 and pre-9/11 periods. Initial Financial Slack is the log difference between a firm's credit limit and its borrowing in the pre-9/11 period. The specifications in Columns (2) -(3) also include dummies for each of the 134 cities/towns firms are located in, 75 industry dummies, and 119 dominant bank dummies, where dominant bank is where each firm has the largest share of borrowing. The specification in Column (3) also includes the interactions of all firm size decile dummies with Initial Financial Slack. The specification in Column (4) is run at the loan-level and the data is restricted to firms that have relations with multiple banks. Thus, the fixed effects specification compares outcomes for the same firm across different banks. Standard errors in Columns (1) -(3) are clustered at the dominant bank level, where dominant bank is where each firm has the largest share of borrowing. Standard errors in Column (4) are clustered at the bank level.
(1) These regressions study the effects of financial slack on changes in default rate, with parametric and non-parametric controls. The dependent variable is the first difference in default rate between post-9/11 and pre-9/11 periods. Initial Financial Slack is the log difference between a firm's credit limit and its borrowing in the pre-9/11 period. Parametric controls include a measure of firm quality, Twice Lagged Default Rate, which is the average default rate of each firm in the pre-pre-9/11 period. Nonparametric controls include Common Director Fixed Effects. These fixed effects are constructed using firm director information: firms that share common directors are considered to be under the same management. Column (4) repeats our standard specification for firms that are part of multi-firm groups , and Column (5) then includes Common Director Fixed Effects in the specification. All regression specifications except Column (1) also include dummies for each of the 134 cities/towns firms are located in, 75 industry dummies, and 119 dominant bank dummies, where dominant bank is where each firm has the largest share of borrowing. Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the dominant bank level.
